Semantics is a part of logic that examines the relations between language objects or terms and their referents. In this realm, such concepts as tIuth, denotation, definition, name, reference and so on are analyzed.In the present article the formation of semantics, its origin, the obstacles in its way, and its historical development will be discussed. Since the discussion about the concept of truth and "the meaning effective predicate" is situated in the center of semantic investigation, and because it was in Poland that Twardowski and his students began research about the concept of truth during 1900-1930, so it is necessary to have a short account of the history of truth in Poland at the beginning of the article. Then Hilbert's attempts in metamathematics and particularly his considerable method in the analysis of metamathematical concepts will be discussed.Finally, there will be a report about the synthesis of truth and Hilbert method in the mind of Lesniewski and Tarski.Vienna Circle’s positivist thinkers opposition to Tarski's views regarding semantic analysis of truth, how Ca/'nap is convinced by Tarski in this field, and also the extension of semantics in these arguments and £n the explanatory essays of Carnap and Tarski are the subjects which have been discussed briefly at the end of this essay.

In other articles, we have examined Mortaza Hajhosseini's natural deduction systems as presented in the second edition of his book, "Two Non-Classical Logic Systems: A New Outlook on Elements of Logic." In this article, our focus shifts to the semantics of these systems and an analysis of the issues surrounding soundness and completeness, as proven by Hajhosseini. We find that the book lacks clear definitions or definite specifications for several semantical terms used, including 'world,' 'supposed,' 'supposible,' 'basic situation,' and 'basic model.' Consequently, the semantic concepts of "validity" and "truth-preserving" in this context can be subject to multiple interpretations, some of which render certain relevant inferences irrelevant while others deem irrelevant inferences valid.Furthermore, we demonstrate that this semantics framework is incompatible with the proof theory presented in the book. The meta-theorems of soundness and completeness, as formulated, are erroneous and can be refuted with counterexamples. For instance, within the truth-functional system's semantics outlined in the book, a logical truth implies any other logical truth. However, the proofs provided in the book's natural deduction system are deemed 'invalid' because they violate Dag Prawitz's "normality" condition.

Mortaza Hajhosseini introduced two truth-functional and non-truth-functional systems in the second edition of his book Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A New Outlook on Elements of Logic. In other articles, I have reviewed the natural deduction and the semantics of the truth-functional system. In this paper, I will address the semantics of the non-truth-functional system and the meta-theorems of soundness and completeness that he claimed to have proven. I demonstrate that: 1. This semantics is based on a new set theory that has not yet been formulated. 2. The definition of ‘model’ in this book defines ‘complete models,’ while all introduced models are ‘incomplete models’. 3. The truth conditions of non-truth-functional formulas are reminiscent of similar formula truth conditions in logic, as emphasized by C.I. Lewis, but are valid in Libnizian semantics. 4. This semantics is not consistent with the proof theory of the book. 5. Therefore, the validity and completeness consequences are actually incorrect and have counterexamples. 6. Negation operators in this non-truth-functional system have been considered truth-functional, while they should be non-truth-functional. 7. A finite number of relationships (exactly five) have been introduced in this semantics, while this number is infinite. 8. Therefore, non-truth-functional logic must be undecidable, while the non-truth-functional system has been declared decidable

'Post-truth' has become a buzzword for numerous current crises: the fragmentation of the media landscape, the ongoing debate about 'fake news', the loss of trust in science, etc. Although these crises take place in society, it is claimed that the roots of post-truth can be traced back to the history of philosophy. Occasionally, it is asserted that Karl Popper's critical rationalism gave rise to post-truth: His rejection of verificationism has limited truth claims in the realm of science. Given the absence of infallible evidence and certainty, critical rationalism calls for challenging scientific authority. I argue that post-truth is compatible with critical rationalism from an epistemological point of view, considering that both positions are critical of certainty. However, in critical rationalism, fallibilism, responsibility, and the idea of criticism are combined, and in this respect, it offers a possible way to overcome the problems that are associated with post-truth. This treatment of the problems of post-truth results from the recognition of moral responsibility to take action on the basis of a hypothesis that remains open to revision.

Relational analysis is one of the well-known types of constructivist semantics which conceptually explains lexical items relying on the relationships among language units. The word ‘ truth’ is one of the key and fundamental concepts in the Quranic worldview, and the discovery of its semantic field in the semantic network of the Quran is highly important as, with the discovery of its sense relations, its synonyms, hyponyms and antonyms are identified, and the place of this concept in the worldview of the Quran is determined. The present study has been conducted using the descriptive-analytical method and on the basis of the achievements of constructivist semantics. Using the semantic components of the word ‘ truth’ , we explained its sense relations and concluded that, in the holy Quran, words such as prophet, book and va’ deh (vow) are hyponyms of ‘ truth’ , qest (justice) and sedq (sincerity) are its synonyms and words such as bahreh (profit), vujub (legal obligation) and towhid (unity) have polysemic relation with it. We further concluded that the words batel (falsehood), kezb (untrue) and la’ ab (play) are complementary antonyms and zann (opinion), reib (doubt) and zolm (cruelty) are implicit antonyms of ‘ truth’ .

In Classical Logic, an argument is deemed valid if and only if it lacks a counterexample. However, arguments like  and  are considered valid based on this definition, despite natural intuition challenging their validity. A New Outlook on the Elements of Logic introduces a novel definition for argument validity, rendering the aforementioned arguments unprovable. This new definition necessitates revisions in argument evaluation, the substitution rule, the definition of logical truth, methods for determining argument validity and invalidity, as well as the definition and procedure of soundness and completeness proofs in Classical Logic. The establishment of the Truth-Functional System of Propositional Logic stems from this revised definition.Asadollah Fallahi critiques this system in "Hajhosseini’s Truth-Functional Semantics," published in Philosophy and Kalam, 2023, Vol. 56, issue 1. While proposing scattered criticisms, this article reveals that, aside from one critique requiring rectification due to an inadvertent mistake, the other criticisms stem from fallacies, unfounded accusations, non-compliance with certain critique conditions, incorrect formulation of the definition of a valid argument, and oversight of consequences arising from new conditions for argument validity and its definition.

In the semantics of “Lisāna Sidq” in the Holy Qur’an, with the aim of solving some problems surrounding the interpretation of this Qur’anic term, the context of the two verses related to it has been studied here. This Qur’anic term in the prayer of Prophet Abraham (AS) is accompanied by two complementary adverbs: “Lī” and “Fī Al-Akhirīn”; To reconcile between these two adverbs, commentators use the word “Lisān” as figurative meanings of “praise”, “remembrance” and in one case, they have considered “fame”, but these meanings do not have evidence in the holy Qur’an. The letter “Fī” in the complementary adverb “Fī Al-Akhirīn” means “Hawl (about)” and the semantics of the term “Lisāna Sidq” shows that the word “Lisān” may mean “speech” or “tongue”: according the former, this term is related to the statements that carries prophetic and truthful promises about “Al-Akhirīn”, and according to the latter, it refers to the tongue that expresses prophetic and truthful promises about “Al-Akhirīn”.

This paper examines the work of Immanuel Kant in the light of a new theory on the nature of truth, knowledge and falsehood (the Inversion Theory of Truth). Kant’s idea that knowledge could be absolutely certain, and that its truth must correspond with reality, is discredited by a dissection of the Correspondence Theory of Truth. This examination of the nature of truth, as well as knowledge and falsehood, is conducted with reference to Sir Karl Popper’s writings on regulative ideas, the criterion of demarcation and the principle of falsifiability. It is argued that if truth is to be regarded as certain, it should be used to describe objects and events in the objective (noumenal) state, and that subjective knowledge must contain (and is improved by) falsehood. Perceptions and knowledge are obtained by the biological and evolutionary process of Active Subjectivism. Ideas we have knowledge of can be metaphysical or scientific, according to Popper’s Criterion of Demarcation. Kant’s “Copernican revolution” claim that our intellect imposes absolutely true laws on nature could not allow for the possibility that ideas might be constructed from fallible perceptions, and hence that all knowledge is uncertain. Instead, he developed a Critique of Practical Reason in which religion, though not provable through logical reasoning, could be proved by our innate moral sense, giving us a Categorical Imperative that could lead to perverse results. By rejecting the absolute certainty of a priori knowledge, and admitting a degree of essential falsehood, we arrive at a more reasonable grounding for moral behavior.

The present study argues about the meaning of "truth" in Rumi's perspective. This article examines the meaning of truth and the way to reach it in Mathnawi. It is an attempt to reveal Jalal al-din Rumi's point of view regarding truth and truth seeking. The author intended to clarify that Rumi has presented a new and specific interpretation of truth-seeking which complete philosophers' and speakers' view. According to Molavi (Rumi), real researchers are those who are affected by their research. He believes that researchers' souls should be evolved due to their study. Otherwise, they would be imitators rather than researchers. Along with expressing the limitations of truth seeking, Molavi has introduced different ways to reach it.